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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF CASE

Plaintiff sued Defendant for $50,000.00 of the proceeds
property claiming a horse barn

she received upon sale

and corrals he had installed on her premises increased the
value.

iff's claim.

Defendant denied

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

The case was tried be
District Judge.

the Honorable Jonathan Brody,

The Court entered its Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law in favor
Plaintiff's case.

Defendant and dismissed

Plaintiff filed a timely notice of

appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Plaintiff's recital of
evidence which supported

s omitted significant

Court's decision.

Most significant was

testimony of Lloyd Smith, a

real estate broker with 17

of experience in selling

real property in

area (Tr p. 290, L. 10).

Mini Cass

Smith had done a market analysis before he listed the
property for sale.

oyd testified that the horse barn and

corrals added no value to Nancy's rural residence and
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igated acreage (Tr p. 300, L. 13).

Lloyd Smith was the

only witness with real estate expertise who testified on the
ific issue of whether the horse barn and corrals added
value to the Defendant's property.
Plaintiff called J. Patrick Merrigan, a certified real
estate appraiser (Tr p. 175, L. 20).

The

adduce testimony from Pat Merrigan about

cost of

construction of the building using regi
the cost of construction.

data regarding

Merrigan had not examined the

barn and corrals (Tr p. 175, L. 9-16).

He was not asked

whether the horse barn and corrals contribut
of

ntiff tried to

to the value

Defendant's property.
The Defendant did not ask the Plaintiff to build the

horse barn on her property, and she did not acquiesce in the
construction of the horse barn until the

ntiff wore down

her resistence by his repeated insistence (Tr p. 240, L. 2024).

There is no evidence in the record that the Defendant

ever wavered from her insistence that the property was
acqui

by her as her separate property, and that she

intended to retain it as her separate property (Tr p. 243,
L.

3-23).
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The Plaintiff was as
L. 1-25).

Due to f

£-employed farrier (Tr p. 330,
problems he could not marry (Tr

p. 23, L. 18-20) He had no financial records to support his
claimed investment (Tr p. 145, L. 13 25).
income tax returns (Tr p. 146, L. 1-7).

He did not file
He had a passion

for chariot racing as a hobby (Tr p. 124, L. 4-7), and he
dreamed of owning his own horse barn to support his
activity.
finally caved into Plaintiff's

When the De
requests that he be

lowed to build a horse barn on her

property (Tr p. 243, L. 3 23), he started assembling it from
he had acquired in the 1980s (Tr p.

two used labor

132, L. 17 20), some used roofing material from the Cassia
Hospital he purchased

$300.00 (Tr p. 134, L. 15-24),

used corrugated metal he bought for $500.00 (Tr p. 134, L.
1.14), and

abandoned irrigation pipe he cut up for

corral posts (Tr p. 136, L. 8.13).

The labor shacks were

just set on concrete blocks (Tr p. 135, L. 14-17).

The

quality of workmanship and materials was substandard (Tr p.
245, L. 1-24).
The horse barn was completed in 2002 (Tr p. 138, L. 13

-3-

19).

In 2006 the Defendant had grown tired of supporting

the Plaintiff's racing habit.

asked him to pay the

irrigation bill for the pasture.
empty money clip at her, and

The Plaintiff threw an
told him to get out of her

home (Tr p. 254, L. 7-14).
Nancy let him use the horse barn and corrals until 2008
without payment of rent or utilit

s

(Tr p. 255, L. 7-24).

Defendant told Plaintiff he could
257, L. 6-12), but he

the horse barn (Tr p.

led to do so.

Plaintiff provided help to

Defendant in cleaning up

the property when she originally purchased it, but he left
it in a state of disrepair and

a trashy condition.

He

hauled in an outhouse (Tr p. 287, L. 17-24, Ex. V), and left
scrap material and boxes of used

shoes lying around.

Defendant had to haul loads of junk to the dump to make the
property presentable, so it could
16).

d (Tr p. 258, L. 2-

The corral posts, which consisted of lengths of

abandoned irrigation pipe, had open ends with no footings
under them.

Over time, they began to sink into the ground,

so they would not support the
334, L. 25 and Tr p. 335, L. 1 4).
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rails and gates (Tr p.

The Plaintiff lived in Defendant's home rent free from
2000 to 2006, and he used Defendant's land and pasture rent
free from 2002 until 2008

(Tr p. 142, L. 13-23).

Nancy was employed on a full-time basis from the time
the relationship began (Tr p. 240, L. 1-10, Ex. FF).
The Trial Court found that the testimony of the
Defendant was more credible than the testimony of the
Plaintiff in the Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Order.

Finding 42.

(R p. 21).

ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL
IS DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
UNDER SECTION 12-121 OF THE IDAHO CODE AND RULE 54(e) (1) OF
THE IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE?
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
NANCY ORTHMAN SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
UNDER SECTION 12-121 OF THE IDAHO CODE AND RULE 54(e) (1) OF
THE IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, BECAUSE THE PLAINTIFF'S
APPEAL IS PURSUED FRIVOLOUSLY, UNREASONABLY AND WITHOUT
FOUNDATION.
The award of attorney fees on appeal is proper under
Section 12-121 of the Idaho Code and Rule 54(e) (1) of the
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Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure when the appeal has been
brought frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation
Durrant v. Christensen, 17 Idaho 70, 785 P 2~ct 634

(1990);

Minich v. Gem State Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 911, 591 P
1078 (1979).
This appeal has been pursued frivolously.
Court's refusal to allow the alleged of

The District

of settlement to

have been entered into the record is upheld by well-settled
law as shown below.

The argument that Rule 408 should not

apply to the alleged offer was disingenuous.
The District Court's conclusion that Orthman was not
ustly enriched was supported by substant

, competent

The District Court's finding

if there had

a benefit to Nancy Orthman, it would not be
unconscionable for her to retain the

fit was likewise

supported by substantial, competent evidence.
In Excel Leasing Co. v. Christensen, 115 Idaho 708, 769
p

585 (Ct. App. 1989) the Idaho Court

Appeals held

that where the Appellant failed on appeal to present any
s

ficant issue regarding a question of law, where no

findings of fact made by the District Court were clearly or

-6-

arguably unsupported by substantial evidence, or where the
Court was not asked to establish any new legal standards or
modify any existing ones and where the focus of the case was
the application of subtle law to the facts,

the appeal was

deemed to be unreasonable and without foundation.
Nancy Orthman is entitled to an award of attorney fees
on appeal.
ARGUMENT
I

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When an action has been tried to a court sitting
without a jury, appellate review is limited to ascertaining
whether the evidence supports the trial court's findings of
fact and whether these findings support the court's
conclusions of law.

Morris v. Frandsen, 101 Idaho 778, 780,

6 2 1 , P 2 nd 3 9 4 , 3 9 6 ( 19 8 0 ) .
The findings of fact of the trial court will be
accepted if they are supported by substantial, competent
evidence, though that evidence may be controverted.
Valley Shamrock Res.

1

Inc.

1

Sun

v. Travelers Leasing Corp., 118

Idaho 116, 118, 794 P 2 nd 1389, 1391 (1990); Rueth v. State,

-7-

103 Idaho 74, 77, 644 P 2 nd 1333, 1336 (1982).
The task of weighing evidence is within the province of
the trial court.

The appellate court therefore accords

great deference to the trial judge's opportunity to weigh
conflicting testimony and to assess the credibility of
witnesses.

Rueth, 103 Idaho at 77, 644 P 2 nd at 1336; PFC,

Inc. V. Rockland Tel. Co .• Inc., 121 Idaho 1036, 1038, 829 P
2 nd 1385, 1387 (Ct. App 1992).

It follows that the

appellate court will view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party.

PFC, Inc., 121 Idaho at

1038, 829 P 2 nd at 1387; Martsch v. Nelson, 109 Idaho 95,
100, 705 P 2 nd 1050, 1055 (Ct. App. 1985).
The findings of the trial court on the question of
damages will not be set aside when based upon substantial
and competent evidence.

Trilogy Networks Sys., Inc. v.

Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 846, 172 P 3 rd 1119, 1121 (2007)
II

THE ALLEGED OFFER, WHICH WAS NEITHER MADE NOR ACCEPTED, WAS
NOT ADMISSIBLE ON THE UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIM UNDER RULE 408
OF THE IDAHO RULES OF EVIDENCE.
The Plaintiff sued the Defendant claiming Defendant was

-8-

unjustly enriched by the horse barn and
her property.

In his Complaint

she built on

(R. P. 1 3) he claimed that

she would be unjustly enriched by the sum

$50,000.00 if

she were allowed to retain the improvements without
compensating him.
In his opening statement Plaintiff's counsel reiterated
that

the case is a case seeking recovery

enrichment.

(Tr p. 7, L. 5-6).

unjust

He stressed that the case

should be restricted to issues of unjust enrichment (Tr p.
9, L. 22 25).

Plaintiff's counsel then c

imed that

Defendant had agreed to reimburse Plaintiff $35,000.00 for
his interest in the property (Tr 7 p. 24 and 25 and p. 8, L.
1).

Defendant's counsel placed Plaintiff's counsel and the

Court on notice that the Defendant denied that such an offer
was made and that evidence of such an offer would be
inadmissible under Rule 408 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence.
( Tr p . 1 0 , L . 2 - 15 ) .
On
the Pla

examination Plaintiff's counsel inquired of
iff " ... after you separated did there come a time

when you and she talked about how she was go
with you on the improvements?"

-9-

to settle

(Tr p. 118, L. 15-17).

Defendant objected on the ground the testimony was
inadmissible under Rule 408 (Tr p. 119, L. 7-11).
Plaintiff's counsel then tried to recast the alleged
offer as an agreement to settle (Tr p. 119, L. 12-15).

The

Court observed that an oral contract had not been plead (Tr
p . 12 0 , L . 3 - 6 and 1 0 - 16 ) .

Plaintiff's counsel then argued

that there was a distinction between an offer to compromise
and evidence of an agreement

(Tr. p. 120, L. 17-25), and

that an agreement should be treated as an admission, even
though he was not suing for breach of an agreement.
In the proposed offer of proof, Plaintiff did not say
the offer was accepted by the Plaintiff.

If the Plaintiff

had accepted the offer, his complaint would have sought
enforcement of the agreement rather than a claim for unjust
enrichment.
The Plaintiff well knew that testimony of the alleged
settlement offer was not to be admitted, but he couldn't
restrain himself from blurting it out (Tr p. 209, L. 9)
The testimony was properly stricken (Tr p. 210, L. 1-2)
Rule 408 is clearly designed to give the parties
freedom to discuss settlement without having their efforts

-10-

treated as admissions of liability or admissions as to the
amount of damage for which they are responsible.
Plaintiff has cited Soria v. Sierra Pacific Airlines,
111 Idaho 594, 726 P2nd 706 (1986)

proposition that

an offer of settlement or settlement agreement may be
offered in evidence to show bias of a witness.

trial court

case involving multiple defendants.
excluded evidence of a settlement
and one of the defendants.

Soria was a

between plaintiffs

The decision was upheld on

appeal.
Soria is distinguishable from the case at bar.

Here

the Plaintiff was not trying to prove bias of a non-party
witness.

The bias of a party can be assumed in a one-on-one

situation.

There is no reason to prove b

was clearly trying to use the alleged

The Plaintiff
r as an admission

liability and an admission on the amount of unjust
enrichment.
The Idaho Supreme Court in Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho
759, 727 P2nd 1187 (1986) reviewed the strong policy
favoring settlement and barring evidence relating to
compromises or offers of compromise.

-11-

That case involved

complex issues of multiple defendants not present

fore

trial court excluded the settlement

this Court.

Idaho Supreme Court held that the trial

evidence.

judges have broad discretion in determining the
admissibility

such evidence, and their decision will not

be overturned

ent a clear showing of abuse, citing

v. Sierra Pacific Airlines, supra.
The t

court properly refused to admit the all

offer.

III

THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT DEFENDANT WAS NOT
UNJUSTLY ENRICHED WAS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL, COMPETENT
EVIDENCE.
In order

the Plaintiff to have prevailed in the

District Court,

Plaintiff was required to prove (1)

the Defendant was unjustly enriched by the construction
the barn and corrals on the Defendant's property and (2)
that it would be unconscionable for the Defendant to retain
the benefits without compensating the Plaintiff.

Hixon v.

Allphin, 76 Idaho 327, 281 P 2 nd 1042 (1955); Continental
Forest Products, Inc., v. Chandler Supply Company, 95 Idaho
739, 518 P

1201 (1974); Gillette v. Storm Circle Ranch,
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et. al., 101 Idaho 663, 619 P 2 nd 1116 (1980).
The measure of damages is not necessarily the value of
the money, labor and materials provided by the Plaintiff to
the Defendant, but the benefit the Defendant received which
would be unjust for the Defendant to retain.

Unjust

enrichment is an equitable doctrine and is inapplicable when
the Plaintiff in an action fails to provide the proof
necessary to establish the value of the benefit conferred
upon the Defendant.

Nielson v. Davis, 98 Idaho 314, 528 P

2 nd 19 6 ( 19 7 4) .
The value of any benefit unjustly received by the
Defendant in an action based upon unjust enrichment must be
proven to a reasonable certainty.
Co., 93 Idaho 607, 469 P 2 nd 45

Olsen v. Quality Pak,

(Cited with approval in

Gillette v. Storm Circle Ranch, et. al supra).
The District Court found against the Plaintiff on both
elements of Plaintiff's claim,

i.e. the Court found the

Defendant was not unjustly enriched, and the Court found
that it would not be unconscionable for the Defendant to
retain the benefit, if any, which was conferred.
Plaintiff's copious recital of evidence supporting the
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Plaintiff's position is set forth in the Plaintiff's
Statement of Facts.

For

time, labor and material expended

evidence was evidence
in constructing t
property.

most part, the Plaintiff's

horse barn and corrals on Defendant's

The Plaintiff

led to produce a single credible

witness who could establish that the value of the
Defendant's property at the time the property was sold was
greater with the horse barn and corrals than it would have
been had they not been constructed on the Defendant's
property.
The Plaintiff produced a certified appraiser, J.
Patrick Merrigan, who had not inspected the barn and was not
asked whether th barn and corrals increased the value of
Defendant's property.
Plaintiff provided witnesses who said the barn was well
laid out to be a

barn for horses, but they provided no

evidence that the barn and corrals increased the value of
Defendant's property.
Plaintiff
and Megan Sorenson Pe

testimony of the buyers, Tony Periria
a which showed they placed a high

value on the barn when compared to the home, but cross

-14-

examination revealed that they had no expertise on the issue
of whether the Defendant's property was worth more money
with the horse barn and corrals than without them.
The Defendant called Lloyd Smith, a real estate agent
and broker with 17 years of experience who had inspected the
premise and had given the Defendant a broker's opinion of
value prior to the time the property was listed for sale.
His opinion of value was $130,940.00.

(Ex. D).

He testified that real estate agents routinely describe
rural homes with irrigated acreage as horse property,
whether the properties have barns and corrals or not
298, L. 8-14).

(Tr p.

The most important part of Lloyd Smith's

testimony was that Nancy Orthman's home and five acres would
have sold for just as much money without the horse barn and
corrals as it sold with them (Tr p. 296, L. 13
300, L. 13).

&

14; Tr p.

He provided comparisons of homes with acreages

without horse barns and corrals to support his opinion that
the market for Nancy's property would have generated the
sale price of $130,000.00 without the barn and corrals.
If Nancy could have received as much money for her
property without the barn and corrals as she received for it
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with the barn and corrals, she was not unjustly enriched.
Although the property was sold to a couple who loved the
horse barn, Plaintiff failed to show that the property sold
more quickly because of the presence of the horse barn and
corrals or that she received more money because of their
presence.
Nancy Orthman considered the horse barn and corrals
which were built with used material and poorly maintained by
Chuck Kendall to be an eyesore (Tr p. 332, L. 3-7).
people the barn and corals may have been treasure.
others they may have been trash.

To some
To

The bottom line is that

Nancy was no better off with them than without, so she was
not enriched.
Judge Brody's finding that Nancy Orthman was not
enriched by the addition of the horse barn and corrals was
supported by substantial, competent evidence.

Findings of

the trier of fact which are supported by substantial,
competent evidence are not to be disturbed on appeal.
IV

ALTHOUGH NOT NECESSARY TO THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION, THE
CONCLUSION THAT IT WOULD NOT BE UNCONSCIONABLE FOR DEFENDANT
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TO RETAIN THE ENRICHMENT,

IF ANY, SHE RECEIVED WAS SUPPORTED

BY SUBSTANTIAL, COMPETENT EVIDENCE.
Once the trial court determined that no benefit was
conferred on Nancy Orthman by the construction of the horse
barn and corrals, it was not necessary for the court to
enter a conclusion that if the Defendant did receive a
benefit,

it would not be unjust for her to retain it without

compensating the Plaintiff.

Nevertheless, that conclusion

by the Court was supported by substantial, competent
evidence and was not an abuse of discretion.
The Defendant purchased the home and acreage for
herself and her three children.

She did not purchase it to

provide a place for the Plaintiff to keep and train his race
horses (Tr p. 330, L. 1-3).

The Plaintiff pestered the

Defendant about building a horse barn on the property, until
she finally relented.

She made it clear to him that he was

not going to obtain an interest in her property by building
a horse barn (Tr p. 330, L. 13-25; Tr p. 331, L. 1-16).
With the exception of occasional intervals in which the
parties separated due to disagreements, the Plaintiff
resided with the Defendant from the time the property was

-17-

purchased in 2001 until an argument in April
the Plaintiff re

2006 when

to help with the annual irrigation

bill for the property.

The Plaintiff threw his money clip

at the Defendant, and the Defendant told him to leave the
home (Tr p. 254, L. 1-9).
The Defendant still allowed the Plaintiff to keep and
train his horses on the property for the balance of 2006,
all of 2007 and until the middle of 2008

(Tr p. 255, L. 2-

25; Tr p. 266, L. 1-25 and p. 267, L. 1-15).

During that

time, the Plaintiff paid no rent for use of the home and
utilities nor for use of the pasture and land on which the
barn and corrals were located.

All of those expenses were

paid by the Defendant {Tr p. 142, L. 13-17; Tr p. 255, L.
15-22).
The Plaintiff did little or nothing to maint
barn and premises.

n the

After he was banned from Defendant's

home he brought in a dumpy looking outhouse (Tr p. 268, L.
1-21) (Exhibit M).
The Plaintiff was given the opportunity to remove the
barn and corrals from

premises before it was sold.

fence posts were not anchored in concrete.
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The

housing from

the sugar factory labor camp were ~ust resting on cinder
blocks.

The Plaintiff cons

moving the barn and

corrals to a property owned by Ken and JoAnna Erickson, but
he did not pursue that opportunity (Tr p. 345, L. 5-21).
When he left the property, it was strewn with boxes of old
horseshoes and scrapped and broken building materials (Tr p.
258, L. 2-16).

He took the gates (Tr p. 154, L. 20-23).

The Plaintiff testified

horse racing was not an

activity pursued for business purposes.
testimony, it was clear that

During the

built the barn and corrals

so he could pursue his passion for

racing.

He did not

build the barn and corrals with an expectation for
compensation or profit (Tr p. 124, L. 2-6).

He had

financial problems when the relationship began (Tr p. 152,
L. 13-23).

There was nothing to indicate that he tried to

improve his financial circumstances dur

the time of the

relationship.
The trial court observed in Finding No. 42 that the
Defendant was a more credible witness than the Plaintiff.
The weight given to the testimony of witnesses is to be
determined by the trier of
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While it may not have been necessary for the Court to
have gone so far as to characterize the Plaintiff as an
"officious intermeddler", the Court's conclusion of law that
Defendant did not receive a benefit which would be
unconscionable for her to retain was well supported by the
evidence and was not an abuse of the Court's discretion.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Nancy Orthman should be awarded her costs and attorney fees.

Respectfully Submitted.
Chisholm Law Office

By:

LQv1AA--lt{;// Llv~1;,'--t.....__

Donald J. Chi
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